Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of 17 selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with 18 anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the standard 3PP 19 experimental design, however, allow alternative explanations: it has been argued that 3PP could 20 be motivated by envy (as selfish dictators earn high payoffs), or could be influenced by the use 21 of the strategy method (which is known to influence second-party punishment). Here we test 22 these alternatives by varying the third party's endowment and the use of the strategy method, and 23 measuring punishment. We find that while third parties do report more envy when they have 24 lower endowments, neither manipulation significantly affects punishment. We also show that 25 punishment is associated with ratings of anger but not of envy. Thus, our results suggest that 3PP 26 is not an artifact of self-focused envy or use of the strategy method. Instead, our findings are 27 consistent with the hypothesis that 3PP is motivated by anger. 
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Introduction 34
Laboratory experiments using economic games have demonstrated that impartial third-35 party observers are often willing to pay costs to punish selfish behavior (Fehr and . In these experiments, an "actor" typically has the choice to pay a cost to benefit a 38 "recipient" (prosociality). Afterwards, a "third party" can respond to the actor's behavior by 39 paying a cost to impose a greater cost on the actor (punishment). Many third parties choose to 40 punish actors who behave selfishly (and selfish behavior is punished much more than fair 41 behavior). These observations have been widely interpreted as evidence that humans not only 42 have social preferences that lead them to act prosocially themselves, but also to intervene when 43 others are harmed by punishing those who fail to act prosocially (Fehr and However, two elements of the standard third-party punishment (3PP) experimental design 49 (described below) lead to potential problems in interpreting observed 3PP as evidence of 50 displeasure over others being treated unfairly. First, in typical experiments, third parties receive 51 small starting endowments, such that selfish actors not only out-earn second parties (whose 52 payoffs they directly affect), but also receive higher payoffs than third-party punishers. 2 Third 53 parties might thus be using punishment to reduce their own payoff disadvantage relative to actors 54 (as punishment is more costly for the punished than the punisher), rather than to respond to the 55 actor's treatment of the recipient (or to inequity between the actor and the recipient). If so, 3PP 56
in these experiments would demonstrate self-focused envy rather than concern with others failing 57 to act prosocially (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Pedersen et al. 2013) . 58
Second, previous 3PP experiments may have incorrectly estimated actual willingness to 59 punishment through their the use of the "strategy method" (Selten 1965 ; Brandts and Charness 60 2011). Under the strategy method, subjects are asked to make decisions about how to react to 61 each possible action of the other players, prior to learning what the actions the other players 62 actually took. In the context of 3PP, instead of responding to a specific actor behavior, punishers 63 indicate a strategy for how much to punish each possible actor behavior. This strategy then gets 64 implemented after the actor makes a decision. 65
The strategy method is popular for 3PP experiments because it reveals how each 66 individual would respond to the full range of actor behaviors (even behaviors which actors rarely 67 choose). However, people may behave differently in strategy method experiments than when 68 responding to actual selfish behavior (Fischbacher et al. 2012) . For example, they may under-or 69 over-estimate how angry they would actually feel in response to selfish behavior 3 , leading to an 70 incorrect measure of actual willingness to punish (Pedersen et al. 2013) . A recent review of 71 economic games suggests that use of the strategy method does sometimes influence behavior 72 (Brandts and Charness 2011); for example, in one study where the recipient was the punisher 73 (i.e. a second-party punishment game), "hot" decisions elicited more punishment than decisions 74 made using the strategy method (Falk et al. 2005) . 75
Thus, two potential design confounds make interpretation of 3PP in previous laboratory 76 experiments difficult. Does punishment really reflect a prosocial concern that the actor 77 mistreated the recipient (be it based on norm enforcement (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004 ), types-78 based reciprocity (Levine 1998) or inequity aversion regarding the payoff differential between 79 the actor and recipient (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) )? Or does it instead reflect self-focused envy or 80 strategy method prediction errors? 81
Here, we conduct two experiments addressing this issue. We systematically manipulate 82 third-party endowments (and thus self-focused envy) and the strategy method (and thus the 83 potential for prediction errors) in a 3PP game. We use these manipulations to test the hypothesis 84 that 3PP is motivated by these factors rather than concerns regarding the actor's treatment of the 85 recipient. We also investigate the association between self-reported emotions and third-party 86 punishment. Previous research has found that negative emotions such as irritation, contempt 87 (Bosman and Van Winden 2002) and anger (Fehr and Gachter 2002; Cubitt et al. 2011) are 88 associated with second-party punishment. Evidence also suggests that third-party punishment is 89 associated with negative emotional reactions, such as moralistic anger (Nelissen and Zeelenberg 90 2009) and self-focused envy (Pedersen et al. 2013 ), some of which could reflect emotions 91 experienced "on behalf" of second parties stemming from empathy or perspective taking. To 92 investigate the role of these different processes, we measure third parties' own anger and envy, 93 as well as their beliefs about recipients' anger and envy. 94
Methods: Experiment 1 95
In Experiment 1, we employed a binary dictator game (the actor could share equally or 96 not at all) with 3PP. We manipulated whether the third party's endowment was equal to the 97 actor's (avoiding an envy motivation) or half as large (creating an envy motivation). We crossed 98 this with a manipulation of whether punishment decisions were "hot" responses to a particular 99 actor choice (avoiding potential strategy method prediction errors) or made using the strategy 100 method (allowing potential strategy method prediction errors). We also sought to directly assess 101 the emotions motivating 3PP by asking how angry and envious third parties felt, and expected 102 the recipient to feel, in response to the actor's behavior. This allowed us to investigate which 103 emotions (anger versus envy) were associated with punishment, and if punishment was more 104 strongly associated with punishers' own emotions, or the emotions they expected second parties 105 to feel. 106
In addition to investigating the motivations for 3PP, we also investigated other players' 107 expectations of, and responses to, 3PP. While there is considerable evidence that third parties 108 punish, there is limited direct evidence of how the possibility of punishment affects selfish 109 behavior (for exceptions see (Charness et al. 2008; Balafoutas et al. 2014) ). Thus we also asked 110 actors and recipients to predict how much third parties would punish, and investigated the 111 association between anticipated 3PP and cooperative behavior. 112
Participants 113
Participants were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online 114 labor market in which workers complete short tasks for small payments (typically less than $1 115 for tasks that typically take less than 10 minutes) (Rand 2012) . Employers use MTurk to 116 "crowdsource" employees for jobs which are easy for humans but difficult for computers, such 117 as transcribing hand-written task or classifying images. In recent years, MTurk has also become 118 popular as a tool for experimental social scientists. MTurk jobs involve a baseline payment as 119 well as the possibility of an additional bonus payment depending on performance, making them 120 well-suited for economic game experiments (baseline payments correspond to show-up fees, and 121 bonus payments are determined by the outcome of the game). MTurk may be particularly 122 attractive to experimental economists due to participants' extremely high level of anonymity, as 123 well as the ability to recruit a much more diverse range of subjects than the undergraduate 124 students typical of laboratory studies. 125
There are, however, a number of potential issues with MTurk as an experimental platform. 126
More importantly, experimenters necessarily sacrifice a great deal of control relative to the 127 physical laboratory (participants might be distracted, engaged in multiple tasks at the same time, (with stakes on the order of $1) and in the physical laboratory (with stakes 10 times as large), 134 using the one-shot prisoner's dilemma (Horton et al. 2011 ), dictator game, public goods game, 135 ultimatum game, and trust game (Amir et al. 2012) , and the repeated public goods game (Suri 136 and Watts 2011) 4 . Thus, although MTurk studies involve less control and lower stakes, there is 137 substantial evidence in support of the validity of data gathered using MTurk. 5 
138

Design 139
Participants were recruited to play an incentivized, one-shot, anonymous dictator game 140 with 3PP. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of actor, recipient, or third-party. 141
Participants received a show-up fee of 30 cents, as well as a bonus that was determined by their 142
decisions. No deception was used. 143
Actors received 50 cents, and made a binary decision to give either 0 or 25 cents to the 144 recipient. Then, third parties had the opportunity to punish actors, based on their decision. In a 145 two-by-two design, we manipulated third-party endowment, and whether decisions were made 146 "hot" or using the strategy method, resulting in four experimental conditions. Third parties were 147 randomly assigned to receive 25 cents (low endowment condition) or 50 cents (high endowment 148 condition). Thus in the low endowment condition, but not the high endowment condition, selfish 149 actors (who kept 50 cents) earned more than third parties. Third parties could then spend up to 10 150 cents to punish the actor, based on the actor's decision. For every cent spent on punishment, the 151 actor lost three cents. 152
Third parties randomly assigned to the hot condition were told whether the actor they were 153 paired with gave 0 or 25 cents to the recipient, and then decided how much to punish. Third 154 4 Other research has also shown that subjects on MTurk show high test-retest reliability on a range of personality measures (Buhrmester et al. 2011 ) and demographics (Mason and Suri 2012; Rand 2012) , at levels comparable to college undergraduates. 5 This limited sensitivity to stake size in economic game experiments is also consistent with other findings regarding varying the stakes in the physical lab (Camerer and Hogarth 1999) (however, we note that while manipulations of stake size often have limited effects on mean game play, they do often influence observed variance).
parties randomly assigned to the strategy method condition indicated, for each of the two 155 possible actor decisions, how much they would like to punish the actor. They were informed that 156 afterwards, they would be matched with an actor and one of their decisions would be 157 implemented, based on the actor's choice. 158
Procedure 159
All participants began the experiment by reading the same set of instructions, in which the 160 full rules of the game were explained. Neutral framing and language were used; punishment was 161 described as "spending money to reduce Player 1's bonus." Participants were then asked four 162 comprehension questions to ensure that they understood that transferring money to the recipient 163 was costly for the actor and beneficial for the recipient, while punishing the actor was costly for 164 both the third party and the actor. 165
Next, participants made their decisions. Actors decided between giving 0 or 25 cents to the 166 recipient. Then, for each of these choices, they first predicted how much the third party would 167 punish them (in cents), and then predicted how angry and envious the third party and recipient 168 would each feel (on 1-7 Likert scales, ranging from "Not [angry/envious] at all" to "Very 169 [angry/envious]"). 6 Recipients predicted how much the third party would punish the actor. 170
Third parties were first reminded of their starting endowment. Then, in the hot condition, 171 they were told how many cents the actor gave to the recipient. Next, third parties chose how 172 much to punish, then on subsequent screens rated how angry and envious they felt, and how 173 angry and envious they expected the recipient to feel. The order of anger and envy ratings was 174 randomized. In the strategy method condition, third parties separately made each of these ratings 175 for the cases in which the actor gave the recipient 0 or 25 cents. 176
Finally, all participants answered a questionnaire that included rating their confidence that 177 the other participants were real, and indicating their age, gender, and level of education. After 178 data from all participants was collected, actors recipients and third parties were matched into 179 groups of three and payoffs were determined and paid accordingly (it is standard on MTurk for 180 bonus payments to only be made once all work has been submitted and reviewed; this delay 181 between completing the task and receiving one's bonus allows for the ex-post matching scheme 182 we used to determine payoffs). 183
In the strategy method condition, after pairing players, we determined which third-party 184 punishment decision to enact based on the actor's decision (to share or not share). In contrast, in 185 the hot condition, we paired players based on the actor's decision (i.e. actors who shared were 186 matched with third parties who decided how to punish sharing actors, while actors who did not 187 share were matched with third parties who decided how to punish non-sharing actors). 7 No 188 deception was used. For screenshots of the instructions and decision screens that were presented 189 to subjects, see Appendix. 190
Statistical analysis 191
We use linear regressions when predicting punishment in cents and emotion ratings on Likert 192 scales, and logistic regressions when predicting (binary) actor decisions. 8 We use robust standard 193 errors, and cluster standard errors on subject when we have repeated observations from the same 194 subject (i.e. in the strategy method condition, in which subjects made punishment decisions 195 about both selfish and fair offers). We exclude participants who did not answer all 196 comprehension questions correctly, because it is unclear how to interpret the behaviour of non-197 comprehending subjects (Horton et al. 2011 ). However, we note that including them does not 198 qualitatively change our results. We begin by confirming that selfish behavior elicits more punishment than fair behavior, 205 collapsing across experimental conditions. We find that, as predicted, subjects spent more on 206 punishment of selfish behavior (M = 2.08, SD = 3.63) than fair behavior (M = 0.21, SD = 1.18) 207 8 Predicting emotion ratings using an ordered probit model produces qualitatively identical results; thus, we report linear regressions for consistency across analyses and ease of interpretation of coefficients. 9 Overall, 61% of subjects answered all comprehension questions correctly (mean number of questions correct=3.34/4, with rates of comprehension on the four individual questions ranging from 75% to 93%). Thus, while a relatively low proportion of subjects answered all questions correctly, we note that subjects did relatively well on each individual question, and emphasize that all of our main results hold when including all subjects and when including only comprehenders. Furthermore, this rate of comprehension failure is typical for economic game studies run on MTurk (e.g. Rand et al. (2012)). 
Effects of endowment and strategy method manipulations 224
We next turn to investigating the effect of our manipulations on third-party punishment 225 of selfishness. Because our key question is which factors led subjects to punish selfish behavior 226 (i.e. to ask how envy and the strategy method influenced punishment of selfish behavior), in this 227 analysis we focus on decisions about punishment of selfish offers 11 . In Figure 2A , we plot the 228 mean punishment of selfishness across conditions (hot, low endowment condition: M = 2.33, SD 229 = 3.78; cold, low endowment condition: M = 2.32, SD = 3.76; hot, high endowment condition: 230 M = 1.63, SD = 3.58; cold, high endowment condition: M = 1.94, SD = 3.47). 231
We find that a regression predicting punishment of selfishness as a function of a "low 232 endowment" dummy (1 = 25 cents, 0 = 50 cents) and a "hot" dummy (1 = hot condition, 0 = 233 strategy method condition) finds no significant effect of the low endowment dummy (coeff = 234 0.509, n = 258, p = .262) or the hot dummy (coeff = -0.145, n = 258, p = .756) ( Table 2 Column 235 1). We also find no significant interaction between the endowment and hot dummies (coeff = 236 0.323, n = 258, p = .730; Table 2 Column 2). Thus, our manipulations had no effect on 237 punishment of selfishness. This suggests that punishment does not reflect (i) self-focused envy, 238 as punishment did not increase when selfish actors earned more than third parties; or (ii) strategy 239 method prediction errors, as punishment did not decrease when third parties made hot decisions 240 rather than using the strategy method. 241 11 Our main results are robust, however, to analyzing all decisions (i.e. punishment of both selfish and fair behavior). When including all decisions, a regression finds no significant effect of a "low endowment" dummy (coeff =0.063, n = 482, p = .813) or a "hot" dummy (coeff = 0.122, n = 482, p = .672), and a regression that adds an interaction term also finds no significant effect of the interaction (coeff = 0.241, n = 482, p = .675). While we found that the strategy method had no effect on punishment, one might argue 249 that even "hot" decisions in anonymous, online experiments may not reflect the psychology of 250 real decisions, given subjects' potential uncertainty that they were interacting with real other 251 players. To address this concern, we asked subjects at the end of the study to rate their 252 confidence that the other players were real (1 = very sceptical, 7 = very confident). When we 253 repeat the above analyses including only "confident" subjects (those who reported a 5 or above, 254 N = 95), we again find no effect of the hot dummy in a regression without an endowment 255 interaction (coeff = -.185, n = 95, p = .819), and no hot by endowment interaction (coeff = -.439, 256 n = 95, p = .792). Thus, even among subjects who reported being relatively confident that the 257 other players were real, the strategy method had no effect on punishment. We also find no 258 interaction between a hot dummy and the confidence variable when predicting punishment (coeff 259 = 0.022, n = 258, p = .923), providing further evidence that incredulous subjects were not 260 responsible for our finding that the strategy method had no effect on punishment. Next, we ask how our manipulations influenced third parties' own emotional responses to 262 selfishness. We repeat the above analyses with own envy and anger, rather than punishment, as 263 dependent variables. Beginning with envy, in Figure 2B , we plot mean envy in response to 264 selfishness across conditions (hot, low endowment condition: M = 2.12, SD = 1.61; cold, low 265 endowment condition: M = 3.07, SD = 2.13; hot, high endowment condition: M = 1.42, SD = 266 1.07; cold, high endowment condition: M = 2.09, SD = 1.58). In regression analysis, we find a 267 significant positive effect of the low endowment dummy (coeff = 0.876, n = 258, p < .001) and a 268 significant negative effect of the hot dummy (coeff = -0.818, n = 258, p < .001) ( Table 2 Column 269 3), and no significant interaction (coeff = -0.283, n = 258, p = .482; Table 2 Column 4). 270
Thus, our manipulations significantly influenced envy. First, participants in the low 271 endowment condition reported more envy. Critically, this increase serves as a manipulation 272 check, suggesting that third parties did actually attend to their endowment, and felt more envious 273 when selfish actors earned more than them. This manipulation check confirms that our 274 endowment manipulation successfully increased envy but did not increase punishment, 275
suggesting that envy does not motivate punishment. Second, participants in the strategy method 276 condition also reported more envy. This suggests that envy may in part be an artifact of the 277 strategy method, rather than a genuine reaction to unfairness. 278
We next investigate anger. In Figure 2C , we plot mean anger in response to selfishness 279 across conditions (hot, low endowment condition: M = 3.25, SD = 2.12; cold, low endowment 280 condition: M = 3.20, SD = 2.09; hot, high endowment condition: M = 2.27, SD = 1.70; cold, high 281 endowment condition: M = 3.08, SD = 1.90). In regression analysis, we find no significant 282 effects of the endowment dummy (coeff = 0.452, n = 258, p = .067) or the hot dummy (coeff = -283 0.363, n = 258, p = .150) (Table 2 Column 5), and no significant interaction (coeff = 0.863, n = 284 258, p = .084; Table 2 Column 6) between the two. 285
However, we note that effects of the endowment dummy, and the interaction term, are 286 both marginally significant; Table 2 Column 6 demonstrates that this is driven by a significant 287 effect of decision method within the high endowment condition (with subjects reporting less 288 anger in the "hot" condition). Thus, anger did not vary significantly across conditions, although 289 there was a trend in the direction of subjects reporting less anger when they had high 290 endowments and made hot decisions. This may suggest that subjects in the high endowment 291 condition made an affective forecasting error in which they expected to experience more anger 292 than they actually did. 293 
Which emotions predict individual differences in third-party punishment? 300
We now directly ask which emotions were associated with punishment by examining the 301 relationship between individual emotion ratings and punishment of selfishness. In this analysis, 302
we consider punishment of either selfish or fair offers as our dependent variable. We analyze 303 punishment of all offers because we hypothesize that the reason that selfish offers were punished 304 more than fair offers is that they elicited more negative emotional reactions; thus, it makes sense 305 to consider the variance in emotional reactions, and punishment, across all offers. We conduct a 306 regression predicting punishment as a function of a low endowment dummy, a hot dummy, the 307 third party's own anger and envy, and the anger and envy the third party predicted that the 308 recipient would experience. We find that third-party punishment shows a significant positive 309 association with own anger (coeff = .807, n = 323, p < .001), a significant negative association 310 with own envy (coeff = -0.264, n = 323, p = .006), and no significant association with predicted 311 recipient anger (coeff = .138, n = 323, p = .376) or envy (coeff = -0.025, n = 323, p = .863) 312 (Table 3 Column 1) . 313
Thus, across experimental conditions and actor transfers, only one emotion variable was 314 positively associated with punishment: Participants who reported themselves being angrier spent 315 more on punishment, while there was no significant positive association with envy or attributed 316 recipient emotions. We also note that own anger continued to be significantly associated with 317 punishment when considering each condition separately (Table 3 Columns 2-5). 318
Interestingly, participants who reported stronger feelings of envy actually spent less on 319 punishment, when controlling for their own anger and predicted recipient emotions. This effect 320 was unexpected, and partitioning data by experimental condition reveals that it is driven by the 321
[strategy method, low endowment] condition. In this condition, there is a strong negative 322 association between punishment and envy (coeff = -0.564, n = 81, p < .001) (Table 3 Column 2), 323 while the other three conditions reveal no significant associations (all p values > .3) (Table 3  324 Columns 3-5). We return to this apparent negative association with envy in Experiment 2. 325 Figure 3 shows the association between one's own envy and anger and punishment. To 326 visualize the independent associations with each variable, we perform a median split on own 327 anger and own envy, and divide participants into four groups accordingly. Figure 3 
or the strategy method. We found that third-party punishment was not influenced by 358 manipulating third-party endowments, despite the fact that third parties with low endowments 359 reported more envy than third parties with high endowments. Third-party punishment was also 360 not influenced by manipulating the use of the strategy method, in contrast to evidence that the 361 strategy method reduces levels of second-party punishment (Falk et al. 2005 ). Furthermore, 362
anger, but not envy, was associated with individual differences in punishment: individual 363 subjects who reported experiencing more anger also punished more. Interestingly, we found that 364 subjects' own anger ratings, rather than their predictions of recipients' negative emotions, were 365 what tracked punishment. Together, these results suggest that third parties experience anger 366 when others are harmed, and that their own anger is associated with their decisions to engage in 367 third-party punishment. We also provide evidence that others anticipate such punishment, even 368 more than it actually occurs, and that anticipated punishment is associated with fair actor 369
behavior. 370
These results leave three important open questions. First, while we interpreted the finding 371 that low third-party endowments did not increase 3PP as evidence that punishment was not 372 motivated by envy, an alternative explanation is possible: while third parties in the low 373 endowment condition had a stronger envy motivation (because they earned less than selfish 374 actors), they also had a smaller income to spend on punishment. If having a low endowment 375 makes third parties more envious (increasing punishment) but also less willing to spend their 376 (smaller) income on punishment (decreasing punishment), these two effects could cancel each 377 other to result in no net effect of our endowment manipulation (as we observed). Thus, it is not 378 clear if such an income effect confounded our results. Second, we did not predict that envy 379 would negatively predict 3PP, and it is not clear how robust this effect is. 
Method: Experiment 2 386
In Experiment 2, we addressed these questions. In addition to asking whether the 387 unanticipated negative association between envy and punishment observed in Experiment 1 388 would replicate, we made two changes to the experimental design. First, we added an additional 389 condition to ask whether punishment would increase if we doubled the endowments that actors 390 and third parties began with. This condition thus allowed us to investigate whether the null result 391 of our endowment manipulation in Experiment 1 resulted because subjects in the low 392 endowment condition were disinclined to spend their (smaller) income on punishment, 393 counteracting an effect of envy. 394
Second, we allowed actors to decide how much money to transfer, in 10-cent increments, 395 and tested whether our results from Experiment 1 would replicate. Because running a "hot" 396 experiment with a large set of actor choices would require a very large sample, and because 397 Experiment 1 revealed that the strategy method did not influence punishment, we eliminated the 398 "hot" condition in Experiment 2. 399 Thus, Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. First, 400
we had three experiment conditions. In the high-high condition, both the third party and actor 401 received high endowments: they each started with 100 cents, and there was thus no envy 402 motivation for 3PP. In the low-low condition, both the third party and actor received low 403 endowments: they each started with 50 cents, and thus there was again no envy motivation for 404 3PP. However, because endowments were half as large, a comparison between these conditions 405 allowed us to investigate whether third parties punish less when they have lower endowments. 406
Finally, in the low-high condition, the third party received a low endowment while the actor 407 received a high endowment: the third party started with 50 cents, while the actor started with 100 408 cents. Thus, selfish actors (who kept more than half) earned more than third parties, providing an 409 envy motivation for punishment. 410
Second, all third parties made their decisions using the strategy method. For each of the 411 six possible actor transfers, third parties first indicated how much to punish, and then indicated, 412 in a random order, how angry and envious they would feel. For simplicity, we did not ask third 413 parties how angry and envious they expected recipients to feel, as we found no significant effects 414 of these ratings in Experiment 1. We note that due to a technical error, emotion ratings were 415 collected incorrectly for subjects in the "low-low" condition and were thus not analyzed. We 416 analyzed our data using the same approach as in Experiment 1, again restricting to 417 comprehending subjects, and using linear regressions with robust, clustered standard errors. 12 418 12 We note that as in Experiment 1, our analyses predicting emotion ratings produce qualitatively equivalent results using ordered probit regressions; we thus again report only linear regression. 
423
We begin by replicating the finding that third parties respond to unfair behavior with 424 more punishment than fair behavior. A regression predicting punishment as a function of cents 425 transferred by the actor reveals a significant negative effect of cents transferred (coeff = -0.629, n 426 = 153, p < .001), suggesting that selfish transfers were punished more harshly. 427
Next, we investigate the effects of our endowment manipulation on punishment, anger, 428 and envy. Because we no longer have a clear binary separation between "selfish" and "fair" actor 429 transfers, we analyze all decisions (i.e. responses to all actor transfers). In each regression, we 430 use actor transfer, a condition dummy, and the interaction between these two as independent 431 variables. In these analyses, the condition dummy term indicates the effect of condition on 432 punishment of the most selfish behavior (transferring 0 cents), and the interaction term indicates 433 whether the effect of condition changes as a function of the actor's transfer. 434
We begin by investigating punishment. We plot mean punishment across conditions, for 435 each actor transfer, in Figure 4 (punishment in response to maximum selfishness: high-high 436 condition: M=3.67, SD=4.53; low-low condition: M=3.46, SD=4.36; low-high condition: 437 M=2.70, SD=4.20). We first investigate the effect of envy on punishment by comparing our two 438 "no envy" conditions (high-high and low-low) to our "envy" condition (low-high). We find no 439 significant effect of the envy condition dummy (coeff = -0.699, n = 153, p = .371) or interaction 440 between actor transfer and envy condition dummy (coeff = .115, n = 153, p = .455) ( Next, we ask whether this result holds when comparing our "envy" (low-high) condition 448 to both of the "no envy" (high-high and low-low) conditions separately, and find that it does 449 (comparison to high-high condition: no effect of the envy dummy (coeff = -0.838, n = 96, p = 450 .360) or interaction (coeff = .142, n = 96, p = .431); comparison to low-low condition: no effect 451 of the envy dummy (coeff = -0.572, n = 101, p = .513) or interaction (coeff = .091, n = 101, p = 452 .596). Thus, we replicate our finding from Experiment 1 that third parties do not punish 453 significantly more when envy motivations are possible. 454
Finally, we compare the high-high condition to the low-low condition to investigate a 455 possible income effect on punishment. We find no significant effect of a high-high dummy 456 (Table 4 Column 2). Thus, third-party 458 punishment does not appear to be sensitive to income (at least over the range of values we 459 consider here): doubling endowments had no effect on punishment. This suggests that 460 We next turn to investigating the effects of our endowment manipulation on emotion 471 ratings; we again note that these analyses exclude the "low-low" condition where emotions were 472 incorrectly measured due to a technical error. We first investigate the effect on envy ratings. In 473 regression analysis, we find a significant positive effect of a low-high condition dummy (coeff = 474 1.67, n = 96, p = .001), indicating more envy in this condition when actors transfer nothing 475 (high-high condition, M=2.44, SD=2.15; low-high condition, M=3.98, SD=2.50), and a 476 significant negative interaction between the low-high condition dummy and actor transfer (coeff 477 = -0.263, n = 96, p = .009), indicating that this effect is stronger when the actor transfers less 478 (and thus earns relatively more than the third party) (Table 5 Column 1). This again serves as a 479 manipulation check, demonstrating that third parties compared their payoffs to actors, and felt 480 envious when they had relatively less. 481
Next, we investigate the effects of our manipulation on anger ratings. In regression 482 analysis, we find no significant endowment effect (coeff = .209, n = 96, p = .682; anger when 483 actor transfers nothing: high-high condition, M=3.85, SD=2.24; low-high condition, M=4.05, 484 SD=2.31) or interaction (coeff = -0.033, n = 96, p = .743) (Table 5 Column 2) when predicting 485 anger. Thus, replicating Experiment 1, we find that anger is not significantly influenced by third-486 party endowment size, whereas envy is. 487 Finally, we replicate the finding that elevated anger, but not envy, is associated with 496 punishment. We regress punishment (of any offer) in the high-high and low-high conditions (in 497 which emotion data was reordered correctly) against a low-high endowment dummy and anger 498 and envy ratings. We find a significant positive association with anger (coeff = .890, n = 96, p < 499
.001) and no significant association with envy (coeff = -.032, n = 96, p = .810) ( Table 5 Column 500 1). We find similar results considering each experimental condition separately (Table 5 Columns 501 2-3). Thus, we replicate the effect that anger is associated with punishment. We do not, however, 502 replicate the unanticipated finding from Experiment 1 that envy was negatively associated with 503 punishment. Thus we conclude that this latter finding was likely spurious. 504 Third parties punish selfish behavior in laboratory experiments, but possible design 513
confounds have left open the question of whether this punishment reflects a true distaste for 514 unfair treatment of third parties. Here, we provide evidence suggesting that 3PP is not an artifact 515 of self-focused envy or the use of the strategy method, and may in fact reflect genuine anger that 516 recipients were treated selfishly. Across two experiments, we support this conclusion through 517 two main findings. First, third parties responded to selfish behavior with as much punishment 518 and anger when their endowments were equal to actors' endowments (ruling out envy 519 motivations) and when they made "hot" decisions (ruling out strategy method prediction 520 errors).
14 Second, individual ratings of one's own anger, but not envy, were associated with 521 individual levels of punishment. 522
Our results have important implications for the role of punishment in promoting 523 cooperative behavior: they are consistent with the hypothesis that impartial third-party observers 524 react to selfishness with anger that motivates 3PP. This would suggest that third parties may 525 indeed incur costs to punish selfishness in a variety of real-world contexts, even when they have 526 not been directly disadvantaged. Our experiments do not, however, distinguish between different 527 "prosocial" motivations for 3PP. For example, the anger and punishment we observe might be 528 caused by displeasure over norms being violated (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) , by motives 529 stemming from types-based reciprocity (Levine 1998) whereby people get utility from harming 530 "bad" people, or by displeasure over the inequity that exists between selfish actors and their 531 recipients (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) . Distinguishing between these possibilities is an important 532 direction for future work. 533
Our results build on previous research concerning the influence of possible design 534 confounds in 3PP experiments. While most 3PP experiments have employed low third-party 535 14 One might argue that it is difficult to draw strong inferences from the finding that our manipulations of endowment and the strategy method did not influence punishment, because they were null results. However, we note that we replicated the null finding that endowments did not influence punishment in both Experiment 1 and 2. Furthermore, our endowment manipulation did have a significant positive effect on envy ratings, providing a positive control that demonstrates that subjects were sensitive to the manipulation. We also conduct a power analysis to assess the smallest effects of our endowment and strategy method manipulations that we could have detected with 80% probability in Experiment 1. We find that smallest detectable effects are (i) a 1.27-cent decrease in punishment in the high endowment relative to the low endowment condition, and (ii) a 1.32-cent decrease in punishment in the strategy method condition relative to the "hot" condition. Thus, while it is possible that we failed to detect a true but small effect of these variables on punishment, this analysis provides a likely upper bound for the size of these effects, and suggests that the use of low endowments or the strategy method cannot fully account for punishment in these conditions. endowments, such that selfish actors earned more than third parties ( (Pedersen et al. 2013) . 543
Here, we provide the first direct test of this question by using the standard method but varying 544 endowment, and find no evidence that envy motivates punishment. punishment of selfishness. One study of second-party punishment found that the strategy method 550 decreased punishment (Falk et al. 2005 ); conversely, another study found that, consistent with 551 strategy method prediction errors, participants who read a hypothetical description of a 3PP 552 game reported that they would respond to selfishness with more anger and punishment than real 553 third parties actually did in a different lab experiment (Pedersen et al. 2013) . 554
Here, we provide the first direct manipulation of the strategy method in an incentivized, 555 non-hypothetical 3PP experiment. We find no evidence that the strategy method influences 556 Finally, our results also provide direct evidence about the 'pacifying' effect of 3PP on 571 potential selfish actors. For punishment to deter selfish behavior, individuals must perceive a 572 strong threat of punishment. Indeed, we found that actors and recipients expected third-party 573 observers to punish selfish behavior, even more harshly than they actually did, and that actors 574 who anticipated more punishment cooperated more. Furthermore, although the average amounts 575 of observed 3PP were fairly low in both experiments, many individual punishers punished the 576 maximum amount allowed (44% of punishers in Experiment 1, 63% in Experiment 2). This 577 provides additional support for the hypothesis that 3PP may discourage selfish behavior in the 578 real world. However, we note that the observed association between cooperation and expected 579 punishment was correlational, and does not establish causality. Using manipulation studies to 580 build on these results is an important direction for future research. 581
Likewise, while our results demonstrate that self-reported anger is associated with third-582 party punishment, they leave open the question of whether anger actually causes punishment. 583
While our results are consistent with the hypothesis that anger causes punishment, it is also 584 possible that punishing makes subjects angry, or that unmeasured third variables (e.g. other 585
unmeasured emotions, such as empathy for the recipient, or disappointment towards the dictator) 586 cause subjects to experience anger and engage in punishment. Alternatively, subjects may have 587 reported feeling anger without actually having experienced it (for e.g., if subjects believe, 588 explicitly or implicitly, that anger is a socially desirable motivation to punish). To address these 589 possibilities, future research should investigate the causal role of anger on punishment by 590 inducing (or attenuating) anger before giving subjects the opportunity to engage in 3PP. 591
Furthermore, if anger appears to cause 3PP, future studies should investigate the processes by 592 which anger arises in response to selfish behavior. 593
We also acknowledge that our results reflect play in anonymous experiments on Amazon 594 Turk, with relatively low stakes. Future research should investigate if envy may influence 595 punishment in situations that are more naturalistic, or in which the stakes are higher (and thus the 596 payoff differences between selfish actors and third parties are higher). While there is substantial 597 evidence that economic game play on Mturk is largely consistent with play in the physical 598 laboratory (see introduction), it is possible that the effect of envy on punishment behavior is 599 dependent on stakes, or would be larger in a less anonymous or more naturalistic context. 600
In conclusion, 3PP of selfish behavior is frequently observed in laboratory experiments 601 and is cited as evidence that people dislike it when others fail to act prosocially, even when they 602 themselves are not harmed as a consequence. Here, we support this interpretation by providing 603 evidence that 3PP is not an artifact of self-focused envy or the strategy method, and may reflect 604 genuine anger caused by selfish actions. 605
Appendix 606
Extended analyses of actor and recipient behavior in experiment one 607
Here, we report more detailed analyses of actor and recipient behavior in experiment one. 608 N = 269 actors (45% female, mean age = 32 years) and N = 300 recipients (42% female, mean 609 age = 30 years) participated and answered all comprehension questions correctly. 610
First, we ask if other players expect third parties to punish, and how anticipated 3PP 611 compares to actual 3PP. Figure 5 plots anticipated and actual punishment across players for fair 612 and selfish actor transfers, and demonstrates that both actors and recipients expect third parties to 613 punish, and to punish more for selfish than fair decisions. Indeed, regressions predicting 614 punishment as a function of selfish behavior demonstrates that both actors (coeff = 3.64, n = 269, 615 p < .001) and recipients (coeff = 2.55, n = 300, p < .001) expect third parties to punish 616 selfishness more than fairness. Next, we ask how anticipated punishment compares to actual punishment. We conduct a 628 regression predicting punishment of selfishness as a function of player dummies. We find that 629 compared to third parties as the baseline, there is a significant positive effect of an actor dummy 630 (coeff = 2.03, n = 758, p < .001) and of a recipient dummy (coeff = 0.823, n = 758, p = .015), 631 indicating that both actors and recipients anticipate more punishment of selfishness than actually 632 occurs. Thus, actors and recipients anticipate high levels of 3PP targeted at selfishness. 633
Finally, we ask if anticipated 3PP motivates actors to share with recipients. For each 634 individual actor, we calculate the difference between expected 3PP for selfish and fair behavior. 635
We also calculate the difference between expected second-and third-party emotional responses 636 to selfish and fair behavior. We then conduct a regression predicting the actor's decision to share 637 with the recipient as a function of these variables, controlling for third-party endowment. (We do 638 not control for strategy method condition, as this manipulation did not apply to actors.) 639
We find a significant positive effect of differences in expected 3PP (coeff = .173, n = 640 269, p < .001) and third-party anger (coeff = .281, n = 269, p = .005), a significant negative 641 effect of differences in expected second-party anger (coeff = -.245, n = 269, p = .018), and no 642 significant effect of differences in expected second-party envy (coeff = -.063, n = 269, p = .373) 643 or third-party envy (coeff = .070, n = 269, p = .250). Thus, anticipated 3PP and anger appear to 644 motivate actors to share with recipients. 645 Figure 6 plots the effect of anticipated punishment and anger. To illustrate the 646 independent effects of each variable, we perform a median split on differences in anticipated 647 punishment and anger, and divide subjects into four groups accordingly. Figure 8 illustrates that 648 subjects expecting above-median differences in punishment and anger are more likely to share 649 than subjects expecting below-median differences. Here, we discuss actor and recipient behavior in experiment one. In experiment one, we 665 find that both actors and recipients expect third parties to punish selfishness behavior more than 666 fair behavior. Further, actors and recipients expect third parties to punish more than they actually 667 do, and to be more sensitivity to actor fairness than they actually are. Finally, actors who 668 anticipate more 3PP and anger in response to selfishness, relative to fairness, are more likely to 669 behave fairly themselves. 670
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that others expect 3PP, and that expected 671 3PP promotes cooperative behavior. While much evidence demonstrates that third parties punish 672 selfishness, there is relatively little direct evidence that the possibility of 3PP decreases selfish 673 behavior (an exception is (Charness et al. 2008) ). Interestingly, we find that expected anger is 674 suggests that third parties may act to promote cooperation not simply through the possibility of 676 material sanctions, but also through the possibility of anger or disapproval. 677
However, we note that we did not manipulate anticipated 3PP and anger, and the 678 correlational nature of our analysis leaves open the possibility that a third variable caused both 679 increased generosity and anticipated 3PP and anger. For example, subjects with strong other-680 regarding preferences may be motivated to share in order to increase the welfare of recipients, 681
and also expect third parties to care more about selfishness, experiencing more anger and 682 punishing more harshly. 683
Interestingly, we did not find that anticipated recipient anger and envy were associated 684 with generosity. One potential explanation is that actors view third-party responses as an 685 unbiased measure of appropriateness, while they expect recipients' responses to reflect self-686 interest. Alternatively, the possibility for 3PP may crowd out actors' motivation to help 687 recipients (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Frey and Jegen 2001) . Distinguishing between these 688 possibilities is an interesting direction for future research. 689 690
Experimental instructions 691
The images below show the instructions and decision screens shown to subjects. 692 693 
Figure 7. Experiment 1 Instructions (high endowment condition). This image shows the
